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REASON AND FAITH
BY JOHN S. MARSHALL
MOST OF US enjoy taking an extreme position in a religious
or political controversy. It seems so neat and clear to dedi-
cate ourselves wholeheartedly to the position which we espouse.
Sometimes we say in a controversy with a man who believes in the
state ownership of public utilities, "Why not be consistent and abol-
ish private property altogether?" Such an extreme position we term
"logical" and "reasonable." "Why not be reasonable," we say, "and
give up all religion if you doubt the historical validity of the scrip-
tures of a given religious tradition?" "Why not be logical," we say
to the doubter of some dogma, "and surrender religion entirely?"
In such cases we think that the reasonable course of action leads to
the carrying out of the principle to its utter limit of application.
It gives us high emotional satisfaction to allow one principle, in its
extreme form, to occupy the whole attention to the exclusion of
every other modifying aspect of the situation.
I imagine that if we should study the mind of Cardinal Newman
with psychological penetration we should find this type of theory
working within his mind. It becomes explicit in his logical writ-
ings, and it accounts for many of his conceptions of church history.
One only has to read his Essay on Ecclesiastical Miracles^ to see
that he is determined to believe in the whole range of ecclesiastical
miracles at any cost. He was committed to the principle of mira-
cles, and he intended to believe in all the miracles recorded. This
becomes particularly clear when he discusses the supposed miracle
of the African Confessors^ who according to the records talked
after their tongues had been removed. When reliable evidence was
collected to show that men had frequently been able to talk after
such an operation, Newman tells us that doubt may work both ways,
1 Now published in Two Essays on Biblical and on Ecclesiastical Miracles.
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and that it is as reasonable for him to be sceptical about the assump-
tion that the Confessors talked naturally as that his critics should
doubt the miracle.- In other words, he has committed himself to
a belief in miracles, and he will take the principle of miracles to
the extreme limit, because he has set his heart on miracles. So
man_\- men think that if they are patriotic they cannot be inter-
nationalists, that if they are true Americans they cannot reasonabl}-
admire a single foreign country.
This seems to me a false logic and a concession to a weak t\'pe
of character building. Despite much popular opinion to the con-
trary, I cannot help believing that a compromise is often more
reasonable than a single principle carried to the extreme. For ex-
ample : it seems to me definitel}' false to say that a church is reac-
tionary in principle because it has kept the historic form of church
government, and man}- of the ancient forms of worship. We are
sometimes told that if we are to be genuine Liberals, we must al-
low no taint of anything historic to touch us. Some Liberals suc-
ceed so well at this task that they become quite unlike the true
saints of the ancient faiths—men like St. Francis and Jesus—and
find themselves all too like the bigots of Fundamentalism. In such
cases extremes are really not so different after all, and actually
differ in details and name rather than in spirit.
Xow all of this is pertinent to a discussion of the relation of
Faith to Reason. There have been times in the history of the
Christian Church and Mohammedan Churches when pure reason
v^as exalted. Such a time for Christianity was the eighteenth cen-
tury. Xo taint of "enthusiasm," for so faith and emotion were then
called, was allowed to contaminate the perfect beauty of pure ra-
tionality. Of course mere reason was very barren, and it was not
surprising that a Rationalist, Pascal, discovered that it gave him
little of what religion should mean to him. So he gave over relig-
ion to that which lay outside of reason, if not to the positively irra-
tional ; he surrendered it to "the heart" which has "reasons" that
are true even though they contradict reason. Intellectually he
doubted the truth of Christianity ; but wnth his heart he believed
what his intellect told him was absurd. Our college students are
frequently desirous of a proof of the truth of religion from the
purely intellectual point of view. They want a geometrical proof
2 Ibid., pp. 392; 393.
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of the existence of God. Theirs is a reaction from the purely faith
type of reHgion
:
"To doubt would be disloyalty,
To falter would be sin."
They have been told that thought is a handicap to the religious
.
life, that man-made systems have no value, that our attempts to
find God are futile. The whole essence of Christianity is to "trust
and obey." Yet the fruits of ignorant and superstitious belief may
be decayed and unholy. How often ignorance and superstition
have blighted well-meaning lives. The difficulty with a religion
of mere faith is that it has no adequate touch with the reality of
the world, no contact with the laws of human life and that nature
which moulds and modifies human life. The life that is based
solely upon the faith attitude has no knowledge to sweeten faith
and to make an assurance that touches the real center of human
personality. That is the reason why an irrational faith so often
passes over into a rationalistic scepticism. Many times our }'Oung
people who have been taught to despise reason learn its value, and
in the excess of new light, turn into complete rationalists. «Again
the meeting of extremes!
What we need is a logic of religion that avoids these extremes.
I have said that a compromise is often more satisfactory than either
of two extremes. That does not mean that a compromise is en-
tirely satisfactory. It does mean that the success of the compro-
mise indicates that we need to seek a conception that takes up the
value of both of the extremes. What we need at the center of our
religious life is a reasonable faith. We ought to view the mind as
fundamentally adventurous, and when at its best trustful, but liv-
ing in the attitude of trust because the confidence is wise, and be-
cause intelligence has guided faith in the direction of its quest.
Our hypothesis of life should be sane, and should be criticized by
the deepest power of thought. Thus only shall we avoid supersti-
tion. But even with the most searching thought, we cannot have
final proof of religious truth before we live our lives. It is only
in the long search of experimenting and discovering that we think
about the meaning of experience and then go forth in the attitude
of reasonable trust. Thus we learn by degrees the meaning of
religion.
After all we must rem.ember that such a venture creates a
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teachable and loveable man. The attitude of eager inquiry and
teachableness is what is so loveable in little children. So often the
man who has mere faith and no trust in reason turns out to be a
dogmatist who cannot be taught, who is accordingly not like the
little child who desires to learn. So often the rationalist without
faith is not like the little child who hopes and trusts the world
about him, who though mistaken in many things is right in that he
believes there is a reason for everything and that if he seeks he
shall find it. The true attitude, it seems to me, is that of reason-
able faith, a faith that modifies its views when the evidence re-
quires it. a faith which joyfully learns the new but holds to the
beautiful and true of the old, a faith which is adventurous and
brave because it has found light in darkness and a gleam of love
in the dark places. This is the type of mentality which works upon
a method that is progressive, fearless and reasonable.
